Abstract
Introduction
In spite of ever-improving development processes and tools, all production-quality software still has bugs; most of these are difficult to track down and resolve, taking the form of Heisenbugs, race conditions, resource leaks, and environment-dependent bugs [13, 34] . When these bugs strike in live systems, they can result in prolonged outages [17, 30] . Faced with failures, operators do not have time to run sophisticated diagnosis, but rather need to bring the system back up immediately; compounding this, up to 80% of software problems are due to bugs for which no fix is available at the time of failure [40] . The results of several studies [36, 17, 31, 11] as well as experience in the field [3, 33, 21] suggest that many failures can be recovered by rebooting even if their root causes are unknown. Consequently, the state of the art in achieving high availability in today's Internet clusters involves circumventing a failed node through failover, rebooting the failed node, and subsequently reintegrating the recovered node into the cluster.
Reboots provide a high-confidence way to reclaim stale or leaked resources, they do not rely on the correct functioning of the rebooted system, they are easy to implement and automate, and they return the software to its start state, which is often its best understood and best tested state. Unfortunately, in some systems, unexpected reboots can result in data loss and unpredictable recovery times. This occurs most frequently when the software lacks clean separation between data recovery and process recovery. For example, performance optimizations such as buffer caches open a window of vulnerability during which allegedly-persistent data is stored only in volatile memory that does not survive a crash; rebooting this system would restart the process, but would not recover the data in the buffers. Attempting to combine data and application recovery in the same code paths is difficult, and often falls to relatively inexperienced developers. In the face of demands for everincreasing feature sets, application-specific recovery code that is both bug-free and efficient will likely be an increasingly elusive goal.
In this paper we separate process recovery from data recovery to enable component-level "microreboots" (µRB). We describe both the general conditions necessary for µRBs to be safe and a specific testbed on which we conducted fault injection to test the ability of µRBs to recover from a variety of failures. We show how using well-isolated, stateless components can make a system amenable to microrebooting. To ensure correctness, all important application state is segregated into specialized state stores, such as databases and dedicated session state stores, thus completely separating data recovery from (µRB-based) application recovery.
Our contribution is to show that:
• Microreboots achieve many of the same benefits in µRB-able systems as full reboots, but an order of magnitude more quickly and with an order of magnitude savings in lost work.
• Due to their low cost, microreboots can always be attempted as a first-line-of-defense recovery mechanism, even when failure detection is prone to false positives or when the failure is not known to be µRB-curable. If a µRB does not recover the system, but some other subsequent recovery mechanism does, the recovery time added by the µRB attempt is negligible.
• µRB-enabling modifications in our prototype Internet service brought about a performance overhead of less than 1% of original failure-free throughput.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the general design requirements for microrebootability, and Section 3 describes our prototype implementation. Sections 4 and 5 experimentally evaluate the prototype's recovery properties using a realistic workload and fault injection, to determine whether µRBs can recover from full-reboot-curable failures and whether there is a resulting benefit in application availability. We also examine the benefits microreboots offer over existing cluster-failover techniques. Section 6 discusses limitations of µRBs, and then presents a roadmap for generalizing our approach beyond the implemented prototype. Section 7 presents related work, and Section 8 concludes.
Design Overview
Workloads faced by Internet services often consist of many relatively short tasks, rather than long-running ones. This affords the opportunity for recovery by reboot, because losing in-progress work typically represents a small fraction of requests served in a day. We therefore set out to optimize Internet-like systems for frequent, fine-grained rebooting. We strive to make microreboots so cheap that they are always tried as a first line of defense whenever a failure is suspected. To this end, we have three design goals:
• Fast and correct recovery of application components
• Strongly-localized recovery, with no impact on the rest of the system
• Fast and correct reintegration of recovered components
Here we discuss how to achieve these goals; the next section describes the realization of these goals in our prototype.
Component-level reboot time is determined by how long it takes for the system to restart the component and for the component to reinitialize. A microrebootable application therefore aims for components that are as small (in terms of program logic) as possible.
To ensure recovery correctness, we must prevent µRBs from inducing corruption or inconsistency in the application's persistent state. The inventors of transactional databases recognized that segregating recovery of persistent data from application logic can improve the recoverability of both the application and the data that must persist across failures. We take this idea further and require that µRB-able applications keep all important state in specialized state stores located outside the application, behind well-defined APIs. Examples of such state stores include databases and session state stores [23] . The complete separation of component recovery from data recovery makes unannounced microreboots safe. The burden of data management is shifted from the often-inexperienced application writers to the specialists who develop state stores.
For an application to gracefully tolerate the µRB of a component, coupling between components must be very loose: components in a µRB-able application have welldefined, enforced boundaries; direct references, such as pointers, may not span these boundaries. Indirect, µRB-safe references can be maintained outside the components, either by a state store or by the application platform.
This design approach embodies time-proven techniques for robust programming of distributed systems; we apply these techniques at finer levels of granularity within applications. In the following section we discuss the implementation of a platform for µRB-able applications, that incorporates these design principles.
A Platform for Microreboots
We added microreboot capabilities to JBoss [19] , a popular open-source application server written in Java. Its support for the enterprise edition of Java (J2EE) [37] allowed us to exploit the features of this programming framework. J2EE is increasingly used for critical Internet-connected applications, claiming, for example, 40% of today's enterprise application market [1] . The changes we made to JBoss can universally benefit all J2EE applications running on JBoss.
The J2EE Component Framework
A common design pattern for Internet applications is the three-tiered architecture: the presentation tier consists of stateless Web servers, the application tier runs the application per se, and the persistence tier stores long-term data in one or more databases. J2EE is a framework designed to simplify developing applications for this three-tiered model. J2EE applications consist of portable components, called Enterprise Java Beans (EJBs), together with server-specific XML deployment descriptors. A J2EE application server uses the deployment information to instantiate an application's EJBs inside management containers; there is one container per EJB object, and it manages all instances of that EJB. The server-managed container provides a rich set of services: thread pooling and lifecycle management, client session management, database connection pooling, transaction management, security and access control, etc.
End users interact with a J2EE application through a Web interface, the application's presentation tier. This consists of servlets and Java Server Pages (JSPs) hosted in a Web server; they invoke methods on the EJBs and then format the returned results for presentation to the end user. Invoked EJBs can call on other EJBs, interact with the backend databases, invoke other Web services, etc.
An EJB is similar to an event handler, in that it does not constitute a separate locus of control-a single Java thread shepherds a user request through multiple EJBs, from the point it enters the application tier until it returns to the Web tier. EJBs satisfy to a good extent the requirements outlined for µRB-able components in Section 2; our further modifications and extensions are described in the rest of this section.
Microreboot Machinery
We added a microreboot method to the JBoss EJB container that can be invoked from within the application server, or by an administrator through a Web-based management interface. Since we modified the JBoss container, microreboots can now be performed on any J2EE application (however, this is safe only if the application conforms to the guidelines of Sections 3.3 and 3.4). The microreboot method destroys all extant instances of the EJB and associated threads, releases all associated resources, discards server metadata maintained on behalf of the EJB, and then reinstantiates the EJB. This fixes many problems such as EJB-private variables being corrupted, EJB-caused memory leaks, or the inability of one EJB to call another because its reference to the callee has become stale.
The only server metadata we do not discard on µRB is the component's classloader. JBoss uses a separate class loader for each EJB to provide appropriate sandboxing between components; when a caller invokes an EJB method, the caller's thread switches to the EJB's classloader. A Java class' identity is determined both by its name and the classloader responsible for loading it; discarding an EJB's classloader upon µRB would have (unnecessarily) complicated the update of internal references to the µRB-ed component. Keeping the classloader active does not violate any of the sandboxing properties. Preserving classloaders does not reinitialize EJB static variables upon µRB, but J2EE strongly discourages the use of mutable static variables anyway (to simplify replication of EJBs in clusters).
State Segregation
Internet applications, like the ones we would expect to run on JBoss, typically handle three types of important state: long-term data that must persist for years (such as customer information), session data that needs to persist for the duration of a user session (e.g., shopping carts or wokflow state in enterprise applications), and virtually read-only data (static images, HTML, JSPs, etc.). We keep these kinds of state in a database, session state store, and an Ext3FS readonly filesystem, respectively.
Persistent state: There are three types of EJB: (a) entity beans, which map each bean instance's state to a row in a database table, (b) session EJBs, which are used to perform temporary operations (stateless session beans) or represent session objects (stateful session beans), and (c) messagedriven EJBs (not of interest to this work). EJBs may interact with a database directly and issue SQL commands, or indirectly via an entity EJB. In µRB-able applications we require that only stateless session beans and entity beans be used; this is consistent with best practices for building scalable EJB applications [6] . The entity beans must make use of Container-Managed Persistence (CMP), a J2EE mechanism that delegates management of entity data to the EJB's container. CMP provides relatively transparent data persistence, relieving the programmer from the burden of managing this data directly or writing SQL code to interact with a database. Our prototype application, described in Section 4.1, conforms to these requirements.
Session state must persist on the application server for long enough to synthesize a user session from independent stateless HTTP requests, but can be discarded when the user logs out or the session times out. Typically, this state is maintained in the application server and is named by a cookie accompanying incoming HTTP requests. To ensure the session state survives both µRBs and full reboots, we externalize session state into a modified version of SSM, a session state store [23] . SSM's storage model is based on leases, so orphaned session state is eventually garbage-collected automatically. Many commercial application servers forgo this separation and store session state in local memory only, in which case a server crash or EJB µRB would cause the corresponding user sessions to be lost. In Section 5.5 we compare the cost of externalizing session state to the benefit of being able to preserve sessions across both µRBs and full reboots.
The segregation of state offers some level of recovery containment, since data shared across components by means of a state store does not require that the components be recovered together. Externalized state also helps to quickly reintegrate recovered components, because they do not need to perform data recovery following a µRB.
Containment and Reintegration
Further containment of recovery is obtained through compiler-enforced interfaces and type safety. EJBs cannot name each others' internal variables, nor can they use mutable static variables. While this is not enforced by the compiler, J2EE documents warn against the use of static variables and recommend instead the use of singleton EJB classes, whose state is accessed through standard accessor/mutator methods. EJBs can obtain references to each other in order to make inter-EJB method calls; references are obtained from a naming service (JNDI) provided by the application server, and may be cached once obtained. The inter-EJB calls themselves are also mediated by the application server via the containers, to abstract away the details of remote invocation (if the application server is running on a cluster) or replication (if the application server has replicated a particular EJB for performance or load balancing reasons).
Since EJBs may maintain references to other EJBs, µRB-ing a particular EJB causes those references to become stale. To remedy this, whenever an EJB is µRB-ed, we also µRB the transitive closure of its inter-EJB references. This ensures that when a reference goes out of scope, the referent disappears as well. While static or dynamic analysis could be used to determine this closure, we use the simpler method of determining groups statically by examining deployment descriptors, which are typically generated for the J2EE application by the development environment. The reference information is used by the application server to determine in what order to deploy the EJBs.
The time to reintegrate a µRB-ed component is determined by the amount of initialization it performs at startup and the time it takes for other components to recognize the newly-instantiated EJB. Initialization dominates reintegration time; in our prototype it takes on the order of hundreds of milliseconds, but varies considerably by component, as will be seen in Table 2 . The time required to destroy and re-establish EJB metadata in the application server is negligible. Making the EJB known to other components happens through the JNDI naming service described earlier; this level of indirection ensures immediate reintegration once the component is initialized.
In the prototype described here, µRBs are considerably less disruptive than full reboots. First, recovery and reintegration is faster: the actions required to µRB an EJB take hundreds of milliseconds, whereas hot-redeploying the entire application (analogous to a warm full reboot) takes almost 12 seconds, while restarting the application server process (analogous to a cold full reboot) takes 52 seconds. Second, since we can selectively µRB only those EJBs suspected of causing an observed failure, unaffected EJBs can continue to serve requests from other users. As will be shown in Section 5.1, only a fraction of active users are making requests that require the EJBs in question, so isolated recovery results in higher overall system availability.
Evaluation Framework
To evaluate our prototype, we developed a client emulator, a fault injection framework, and an automated failure detection, diagnosis, and recovery system. Within this framework, we ran experiments using our modified version of JBoss and a J2EE application.
Test Application
Although the open-source JBoss application server hosts production applications in many companies, we have found companies unwilling to provide us with the applications themselves. We therefore evaluated our technique on a modified version of RUBiS [6] (Rice University Bidding System), a J2EE/Web-based auction system that mimics eBay's functionality. RUBiS maintains user accounts, allows bidding on, selling, and buying of items, has search facilities, customized information summary screens, user feedback pages, etc. RUBiS consists of 26K lines of noncomment source code in 582 Java files. We extended RUBiS to maintain server-side session state that enables users to log on and preserve their session information across interactions with the Web site. Since RUBiS was written to study different design strategies for J2EE applications, a few different implementations are provided; the implementation we use consists entirely of stateless session EJBs and entity EJBs.
The structure of RUBiS is typical of J2EE applications, in that there is a separate session EJB implementing each user operation and interfacing with entity beans. For example, there is a "place a bid on item X" EJB and a "view bid history for item X" EJB; the two session EJBs interact with the entity EJB implementing the "bid entity," which maintains bid information in the database. This illustrates why the EJB is a natural unit of recovery. Any unit smaller than an EJB would hinder independent recovery, because there would be too many dependencies to take into account within the EJB boundary.
Long-term data in RUBiS consists of user account information, item information, bid/buy/sell activity, etc. and is maintained in a MySQL database through 9 entity EJBs: IDManager, User, Item, Bid, Buy, Category, OldItem, Region, and UserFeedback. MySQL is crash-safe and recovers fast for our datasets (132K items, 1.5M bids, 100K users). Read-only presentation data, such as static HTML and GIF images, are stored in a journaling Ext3FS read-only filesystem accessed only by the stateless Web server. Session data in RUBiS takes the form of items that a user buys/sells/bids on during her session; we store this state in an extended version of SSM [23] . Session state in SSM is leased, rather than permanently allocated, which means that the application need not worry about reclamation.
Fault Injection
We measured end-user-perceived system availability in the face of failures caused by faults we injected, with the recognition that no fault injection experiment can claim to be complete or to accurately reflect real-life faults. As mentioned in Section 1, our work focuses exclusively on failures that can be cured with some form of a reboot. Despite J2EE's popularity as a commercial infrastructure, we were unable to find any published systematic studies of faults occuring in production J2EE systems, so we relied on advice from colleagues in industry who routinely work with enterprise applications or application servers [13, 34, 28, 12, 33, 21] . These discussions helped us conclude that J2EE systems suffer from the following categories of softwarerelated failures:
• accidental use of null references (e.g., during exception handling) that result in NullPointerException
• hung threads due to deadlocks, interminable waits, etc.
• bug-induced corruption of volatile metadata
• leak-induced resource exhaustion
• various other Java exceptions and errors that are not handled correctly
We aimed to reproduce these problems in our system by adding facilities for runtime fault injection: in our experiments we can (a) set component class variables to null, (b) directly induce deadlock conditions and infinite loops in EJBs, (c) alter global volatile metadata, such as garble entries in the JNDI naming service's database, (d) leak a certain amount of memory per call, and (e) intercept calls to EJBs and, instead of passing the call through to the component, throw an exception/error of choice.
We were concerned that our fault injection mechanism may not provide sufficient coverage of realistic faults visible to the J2EE applications. We therefore used both FIG [4] and FAUmachine [5] to inject hundreds of faults underneath our HotSpot Java virtual machine layer: memory and register bit flips, disk block errors, network packet drops, and erroneus returns from system calls for memory allocation and input/output. In all our test cases the outcome was either a Java exception (a condition we can simulate with mechanism (e) above), a JVM crash (which requires JVM restart), a resource leak (e.g., because free() or close() failed), or erroneous data (which we explicitly do not address in this work). These results are consistent with similar findings in other systems [7] . We therefore considered it sufficient to study our system's behavior under our injected faults, corresponding to application-level bugs.
Client Emulation
In order to emulate realistic clients, we extended and used the load generator that ships with RUBiS. It takes a description of the workload for emulated clients in the form of a state transition table T , with the client's states as rows and columns. These states correspond naturally to the various operations possible in RUBiS, such as Register, SearchItemsInCategory, AboutMe, etc. (29 in total). A table cell T (s, s ′ ) represents the probability of a client transitioning from state s to state s ′ ; e.g., T (ViewItem, BuyNow) describes the probability we associate with an end user clicking on the "Buy Now" button after viewing an item's description.
The emulator uses T to automatically navigate the RUBiS web site: when in s, it chooses a next state s ′ with probability T (s, s ′ ), constructs the URL representing s ′ and does an HTTP GET for the given URL. Inbetween successive clicks, emulated clients have a think time based on a random distribution with average 7 seconds and maximum 70 seconds, as done in the TPC-W benchmark [35] . The emulator uses a separate thread for each emulated client. In choosing the workload for our tests, we mimic the real workload seen by a major Internet auction site [39] ; our workload is described in Table 1 .
User operation results mostly in... Fraction of workload Read-only DB access (e.g., ViewItem, ViewBidHistory) 32% Creation/deletion of session state (e.g., Login, Logout) 23% Exclusively static HTML content (e.g., home page) 12% Search (e.g., SearchItemsInCategory) 12% Forms that update session state (e.g., MakeBid, BuyNow) 11% DB updates (e.g., CommitBid, RegisterItem) 10% In choosing the number of clients to emulate, we aimed to maximize system utilization while still getting good performance; for our system, this balance was reached at 350 concurrent clients. This is slightly more aggressive than current Internet services, which typically run their application server nodes at 50-60% utilization [25, 14] . We deployed our application server with an embedded Web/servlet tier on Athlon 2600XP machines with 1.5 GB of RAM; the MySQL database and SSM were hosted on Pentium 2.8 GHz nodes with 1 GB of RAM and 7200rpm 120 GB hard drives. The client emulator ran on a 4-way P-III 550 MHz multiprocessor with 1 GB of RAM. All machines were interconnected by a 100 Mbps Ethernet switch and ran Linux kernel 2.4.22 with Java 1.4.1 and J2EE 1.3.1.
Failure Detection
To enable automatic recovery, we implemented failure detection in the client emulator and primitive diagnosis facilities on the server side (described in the next section). Of course, real end-user Web browsers do not automatically report failures to the Internet services they use. What our client-side detector mimics is WAN services that deploy "client-like" end-to-end monitors around the Internet to can detect a service's user-visible failures [20] .
If a response to a request is not received within a certain amount of time, the client concludes the request has failed. Responses that do arrive can be correct or incorrect: a bad response is either (a) a network-level error, such as not being able to connect to server, (b) an HTTP 4xx or 5xx error, (c) an HTML page containing particular keywords that we know to be indicative of application errors, (d) an unexpected Web page, such as a login prompt when the user is already logged in, or (e) certain application-specific errors, such as a Web page with a negative item ID. Searching for error, failed, and exception in the returned HTML successfully detects all error pages generated by RUBiS in our experiments, with no false positives or false negatives. We ensured that none of the simulated users sells an item whose description could match these patterns. Complex failures, such as an erroneous bid loss, surreptitious modifications of bid amounts, etc. require manual detection.
When the client detect a failure, it performs a number of retries, emulating a browser's response to an HTTP/1.1 Retry-After reply, or a user manually reloading the page. If success does not occur within the configured number of retries, a failure report is sent to the server-side recovery service. The client emulator only retries idempotent operations; we encoded idempotency information based on our knowledge of the application. The only non-idempotent operations are: "register new item for auction", "make bid on item", "buy item now", and "give feedback on user". Other operations, such as "search item by category" or "register new user" are retry-safe.
Diagnosis and Recovery
We added to JBoss a recovery service that performs very simple failure diagnosis and recovery. This service listens on a UDP port for failure reports from the monitors. A failure report contains the failed URL and the type of failure observed. Using static analysis, we derived a mapping from each RUBiS URL to a path/sequence of calls to servlets and EJBs. The recovery service maintains for each component in the system a score, which gets incremented every time the component is in the path originating at a failed URL. The recovery policy for stateless session EJBs is simple: if a score exceeds a configured threshold, the recovery service µRBs the corresponding EJB. Entity beans, however, are located at the intersection of several call paths, because multiple URLs (operations) use the same entity EJB. In this case, the recovery service will wait to get failure reports from a configured number of different URLs mapping to that entity EJB before deciding to µRB it.
We emphasize that accurate or sophisticated failure detection is a non-goal of this work: to the contrary, our simplistic approach to diagnosis often yields false positives, but our goal is to show that the mistakes resulting even from simple or "sloppy" diagnosis are tolerable because of the very low cost of µRBs. In light of our naive diagnosis, the results we report are conservative.
Measuring Action-Weighted Goodput
A simple approach to measuring the effect of downtime on end users would be to measure goodput (i.e., number of requests completed successfully) under partial-failure conditions, averaged across all clients. This is usually how performability [26] is measured, yielding the amount of work successfully completed over a period of time in the presence of failures. Unfortunately, this simple metric fails to distinguish between operations that are relatively slow (e.g., performing a buy operation) and those that are fast (e.g., accessing the static home page). The net effect is that, in the presence of certain failures in the application server, goodput actually goes up, because the simulated user no longer waits for long-running operations, which fail immediately. Consequently, the simulated client is able to perform many fast operations in a small amount of time, artifically inflating goodput and masking the fact that a real user would not get useful work done.
Another problem with the simple goodput metric is that it does not allow operations to be connected to each other. If a user searches for an item and then fails on the buy operation, the entire interaction has failed, as far as the user is concerned. In other words, the goodput metric fails to capture the fact that user interactions are actually sequences of 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Figure 1 . Full reboots vs. microreboots: We injected a null reference fault in SB CommitBid, then a corrupt JNDI database fault for User-Item, followed by a RuntimeException in SB BrowseCategories, and a Java Error in SB CommitUserFeedback. Left graph shows automatic recovery via full application reboot; right graph shows recovery from the same faultload using µRBs. SB CommitBid took 387 msec to recover, User-Item took 1742 msec, SB BrowseCategories 450 msec, and SB CommitUserFeedback 404 msec. In reaction to the second failure, our recovery service's diagnosis included 6 false positives, resulting in 6 unnecessary µRBs, totaling 4765 msec. In spite of this, there are 89% fewer failed requests (425 vs. 3916) and 9% more successful requests (61527 vs. 56028) in the case of µRB-ing.
correlated operations that need to succeed "atomically" for the user to be satisfied. We therefore evaluated the availability of our prototype using a new metric, action-weighted goodput (G aw ). We view a user session as beginning with a login operation and ending with an explicit logout or abandonment of the site. Each session consists of a sequence of user actions. Each user action is a sequence of operations that culminates with a "commit point": an operation that must succeed for that user action to be considered successful. For example, an action may take the form of "search for a pair of Salomon ski boots and place a $200 bid on them"; this action is successful if and only if all operations (i.e., HTTP requests) within that action succeed; otherwise, the action fails as a unit.
Whenever an operation fails, all operations in the containing action are counted as failed; when a "commit point" succeeds, all operations in the containing action count as successful. G aw accounts for the fact that both long-running and short-running operations must succeed for a user to be happy with the site. G aw also captures the fact that, when an action with many operations succeeds, it often means that the user got more work done than in a short action.
In our auction application, we identified nine commit points: registering a new user, auctioning a new item, making a bid, performing a "buy now", leaving user feedback, viewing account information, logging out, spontaneously deciding to abandon the site, and clicking to the homepage after a sequence of browse operations (if the user browses and returns to the homepage then he/she has still accomplished useful work). A user action is aborted any time the client detects a failure and all retries have been exhausted.
Evaluation Results
We evaluated five different aspects of our prototype. Section 5.1 finds that µRB-based recovery is an order of magnitude faster than full reboots and just as effective. Section 5.2 shows that combining µRBs with failover in clusters can reduce failed requests by 94% compared to full reboots. In Section 5.3 we show that µRB-based recovery combined with a false positive rate of 97% or less in failure detection achieves better levels of availability than full reboots with perfect detection. Section 5.4 shows that µRBs are as effective as full reboots in preventing resource-leak-induced failures, but do so at a fourth of the cost in lost work. Finally, in Section 5.5, we evaluate the performance impact of our microreboot-enabling changes and find less than 1% loss in average throughput and human-imperceptible increase in average latency.
Recovering from Reboot-Curable Failures
To illustrate the end-user-visible differences between recovering with a full reboot vs. using µRBs, we injected a sequence of faults into the application and allowed the system to automatically recover from failure in two ways: by restarting RUBiS or by µRB-ing a component, respectively. We consider recovery to be successful when end users do not experience any more failures after recovery (unless new faults are deliberately injected). JBoss allows for a J2EE application to be hot-redeployed, and this constitutes the fastest way to do reboot-based recovery in unmodified JBoss; we use RUBiS application restart as a baseline, and call this a full reboot (FRB). Figure 1 shows G aw as measured by the emulated clients; each sample point represents the number of successful/failed requests observed during the corresponding 1-second interval. In choosing the locations for fault injection, we wanted to study the extremes of recovery time, as well as the spectrum of workload-induced effects. Hence, we injected the first fault in the component that takes the shortest time to recover, the seconds fault in the one that takes the longest, the third fault in the most frequently called component, and the fourth fault in the least frequently called one. Although our recovery service misdiagnosed 6 additional components as faulty after the second fault injection, µRBs still reduced the overall number of failed requests by an order of magnitude.
To understand the factors that contribute to this reduction, we directed our attention to the dips in G aw . The impact of a failure and recovery action can be qualitatively estimated by the area of the corresponding dip in G aw : the larger this area, the higher the disruption of the service. The dip's area is determined by recovery time, the time to reach back to pre-failure performance levels, and the number of requests that were turned away during recovery. We now look at each factor in isolation.
Effects of Small Recovery Units
The longer the service is unavailable, the wider the dip in G aw : submitted requests cannot be served during recovery, and user actions started in the past fail as users unsuccessfully attempts operations during recovery, causing operations to retroactively be counted as failed. This explains why G aw = 0 during each full reboot recovery. As described in Section 3, some EJBs have dependencies that require them to be µRB-ed together. We grouped such inter-dependent EJBs together into common JAR files (Java ARchive) and µRB by JAR. The largest such group, User-Item, contains 5 entity EJBs: Category, Region, User, Item, and Bid-any time one of these EJBs requires a µRB, we µRB the entire User-Item JAR file. This is the longestrecovering component; it is possible though to restructure the application such that each EJB is independently µRB-able, but we have not performed these optimizations yet.
The time to µRB a component varies considerably; this is mainly because over 90% of µRB time is spent reinitializing the component, and the amount of initialization varies between EJBs. In the particular case of entity EJBs, initialization includes establishing connections to the database, since entity EJB state is automatically persisted in the database by the application server. Finally, we also believe time measurements at sub-second granularity are likely to be influenced by thread scheduling events. The time required to µRB multiple components (e.g., in reaction to a propagating failure) is theoretically additive, but, as we will see in subsequent sections, in practice µRB times are less than additive.
Effects of Rapid Reintegration
Even when a system is "back up" from a functional point of view, it takes a while to recover to the pre-failure performance level after a FRB: caches need to be warmed up, DB connections are to be reestablished, etc. Performance recovery time explains the width of the G aw dip following the completion of functional recovery. In the experiment of Figure 1 , it took more than half a minute for performance to be restored after FRB-based recovery. In the case of µRB-ing, due fast reintegration of the recovered component, the performance impact is lower.
To illustrate the performance-related G aw dip more precisely, we zoom in on the first recovery of Figure 1 and show in Figure 2 the request response times measured at the end users during that period. The higher latency is a reflection of the system's poorer performance during this interval, combined with an overload situation caused by the clients piling up to resubmit requests following the recovery; the cumulative result is the lower throughput seen in Figure 1 . Note that we disabled timeout-based failure detection for these experiments; with this detection turned on, latencies exceeding the threshold turn into end user visible failures and widen the dip in FRB G aw . Several researchers [27, 2] found that response times exceeding 8 seconds cause computer users to get distracted from the task they were pursuing and engage in others; industry reports [41] cite 8-second response times as the typical threshold beyond which customers abandon ecommerce Web sites; Miller [27] found that response times below 2 seconds are sufficient to maintain a feeling of interactivity for most users. Since µRB-based recovery can keep response times below the 8-second threshold at all time (even below 2 seconds in our experiment), whereas FRB-based recovery does not, we would expect user experience to be improved in a system that uses µRB-based recovery. Figure 1 shows that G aw drops to zero during a FRB, meaning that the system serves no requests during that period of time. In the case of µRB-based recovery, however, G aw never drops to zero. This indicates that failure and recovery are contained, allowing most of the system to continue serving requests while the faulty component is being recovered. To illustrate this effect, we grouped the various client operations into 4 functional groups: bid/buy/sell, search, browse/view, and login/logout. Figure 3 shows the end-user perceived availability of each of these functionality groups.
Effects of Recovery Containment
A solid vertical line indicates that, at the corresponding point in time, an end user had an outstanding request belonging to that functionality group and the request eventually completed successfully. Hence, the end user was able to conclude that the service was "up", servicing its request. The absence of such a line indicates that the system was not processing a request in that category, either because it was down or because no such request was submitted.
When FRB was used, the entire application became unavailable during recovery, whereas in the case of µRB, most components continued serving requests while the faulty ones recovered. From a functionality perspective, the µRB is not qualitatively noticeable, as the recovering component (SB CommitBid) shares responsibility for its bid/buy/sell group with 5 other session EJBs and 4 entity EJBs; it is therefore unlikely that a significant fraction of end users will notice the brief outage.
Complementing Cluster Failover with µRB
In a cluster, the unit of rebootability is a full node, which is small relative to the cluster as a whole; this begs the question of whether µRBs can yield any benefit in such systems. To study this question, we built a cluster of 2 independent application server nodes. Clusters of 2-4 J2EE servers are typical in enterprise settings, with high-end financial and telecom applications running on 10-24 nodes [14] ; a huge service like eBay runs on pools of clusters totaling 2000 application servers [10] .
In front of the two nodes we place a load balancer LB . Under failure-free operation, LB distributes new incoming login requests evenly between the two nodes. For established sessions, LB implements server affinity, i.e., nonlogin requests are directed to the node on which the session was originally established. If we inject a fault in one of the server instances (N faulty ), then the failure monitor detects the failure and reports it to the load balancer; LB redirects the load to the other node (N good ) while N faulty is recovering by µRB-ing or FRB-ing. Once N faulty is back up, LB resumes routing requests to N faulty .
Reducing Impact of Session State Loss with µRB
In the first set of experiments, we used a simple failover policy: as soon as LB is notified of N faulty 's failure, it routes all incoming requests to N good , regardless of session affinity. In the µRB case, we used our modified application server, while the FRB case used vanilla JBoss. For both experiments we used a version of RUBiS that uses the Web server's HttpSession mechanism for storing server-side session state-this is fairly usual. The volatile HttpSession objects offer high access performance but cannot survive FRBs. We ran a load of 700 clients against the cluster and allowed it to recover from a deadlock fault injected in the UserFeedback entity EJB (this component is invoked by several operations, including "leave feedback on user", "view my information", "view seller feedback", etc.) We set timeout-based failure detection to 8 sec, corresponding to the earlier cited threshold for end-user patience.
In the face of failure, µRBs offered the preservation of HttpSession objects, which survive µRBs but not FRBs, and faster recovery time: our µRB-able cluster failed 66% fewer requests than the FRB-recovering cluster (378 failures vs. 1144). Specifically, 60% of failures in the FRB case were caused by requests in sessions that were initially bound to N faulty but then were failed over to N good during N faulty 's recovery-these sessions failed because their session state was not available. Of the remaining 40%, some failures were caused by N faulty -bound sessions that returned to N faulty after recovery and did not find their session state, while the rest failed because they were issued while N faulty was FRB-ing. In the case of µRB, virtually all failed requests were due to being routed to N good and not finding their HttpSession objects; fast recovery reduced the number of requests that had to fail over and hence notice the loss of session state.
Using µRB to Reduce Overload of Good Nodes
In order to factor out the effect of session state availability, in the second set of experiments we enabled both the FRB and the µRB cluster with external session state storage. We ran SSM-enabled RUBiS in both clusters, injected the same deadlock fault as before, and used the same failover policy. Figure 4 shows the resulting G aw .
The main difference compared to the previous experiment is that now N good is able to process the failed-over requests, since their session state is in SSM. This ability, however, has a downside: whereas in the previous experiment requests within N faulty 's sessions failed early when arriving at N good , now N good can become quickly overloaded during N faulty 's recovery. As a result, when using FRB recovery, response time on N good increases beyond 8 seconds and eventually triggers N good 's reboot shortly after N faulty started rebooting. This is why G aw drops to zero in the left graph of Figure 4 . In the µRB case, however, there is not enough time for N good to become overloaded, thus saving the cluster from a double reboot. The net effect is a 96% reduction in the failed requests when using µRBs.
Although both FRB nodes eventually recovered gracefully, in other similar experiments N faulty and N good oscillated between overload and FRB-based recovery, but µRBs never induced such behavior. We asked our colleagues in industry whether commercial application servers do admission control when overloaded, and were suprised to learn that they currently do not [25, 14] . For this reason, cluster operators need to significantly overprovision their clusters or use expert-tuned load balancers that can avert the overload and oscillation problems. We showed here that µRB-based fast recovery may provide a complement to both overprovisioning and sophisticated load balancing. N faulty 's FRB-recovery, all 700 clients fail over to N good , leading to temporary overload; this causes N good to stop serving requests for a short time interval, triggering N good 's recovery. In the case of µRBs, overload occurs briefly but does not last long enough to impact end users. Timeout-based failure detection is set at 8 sec; in both cases we use SSM to store session state.
Avoiding Failover Altogether
To explore the possibility of not doing failover at all, we performed a third set of experiments comparing best-case scenarios for FRB and µRB without SSM. Given the same cluster setup, faultload, and workload, we changed the load balancing policy as follows: in the FRB case, LB fails over only new login requests during N faulty 's recovery, while in the µRB case, LB performs no failover at all. In the former case, LB immediately fails requests that it knows would fail due to unavailability of session state, thus avoiding the consumption of server resources and averting N good 's overload. Figure 5 shows that µRB-ing without failover reduces the number of failed requests by 95% over FRB-ing with failover. More interestingly, however, µRB-ing without failover results in fewer failures than µRB-ing in any of the previous experiments, indicating that the coarseness of failover may actually reduce the benefits of µRB-based recovery. This can be explained by the localization of recovery effects shown in Figure 3 : N faulty can be more useful if allowed to continue serving requests while recovering.
We therefore believe that, in µRB-able clusters, one should first attempt µRB-based recovery prior to failover; should µRB-based recovery fail, LB can trigger failover and perform a full reboot of N faulty . The cost of µRB-ing in a non-µRB-curable case is negligible compared to the overall impact of recovery (in our case, 16 failed requests, corresponding to 3 user actions). This seems a small price to pay for potential order-of-magnitude benefits; moreover, µRB-ing prior to failover will largely preserve the cluster's load dynamics.
These experiments showed that, in a small cluster, µRBs complement redundancy/failover and provide an effective way to improve the recovery properties of cluster nodes, with relatively little engineering. Using µRBs reduces the number of failed requests both when an external session state store is or isn't available. µRB-ing can avert node overload induced by failover; in some cases, µRBs may even obviate the need for failover.
Tolerating Lax Failure Detection
In general, downtime for an incident consists of the time it takes for the failure to be detected by a monitor (T det ), the time to diagnose the faulty component (T diag ), and the time LB redirects all new login requests over to N good during N faulty 's recovery, and fails N faulty -bound sessions immediately, thus averting overload.
In the µRB-recovering case, LB does no failover at all. Client-side timeout is 8 sec; no session state store is used.
to recover (T rec ): T down = T det +T diag +T rec . Failure detection quality can be characterized by three parameters: T det , the monitor's false positive rate FP det (how many of the total detections were in fact mistaken), and the false negative rate FN det (how many of the actual failures were missed). Failure monitors typically make tradeoffs between these parameters, e.g., a longer T det generally yields lower FP det and FN det , since the more sample points can be gathered, the more thorough the analysis.
In this section we show that our system using µRB-based recovery is more tolerant to both longer T det and higher FP det , as compared to FRBs; this gives monitors more freedom in making tradeoffs. Figure 6 shows the number of failed requests resulting from the two types of recovery as a function of T det and FP det , respectively. To vary time to detection, we introduced an artificial delay in the monitor's reporting of observed failures; since failure reporting is down over UDP in a LAN, we consider T det ≈ 0 in the absence of delays. To vary the false positive rate, we artificially triggered "failure detected" events in the monitor, prompting recovery on the server side. Varying the false negative rate is not interesting for our comparison, because its effects are independent of the technique used to recover (since it does not get triggered).
The graph on the left shows that, if we desired to maintain the same level of availability as zero-time-FD FRB, then µRB-ing would allow detection time to take 53 seconds longer. We expect the two curves to eventually meet for some high values of T det , because eventually the requests that fail due to the detection delay start dominating the total number of failed requests and drowning out those that fail due to the recovery method.
The graph on the right shows that µRB-ing allows an increase of almost two orders of magnitude in the monitors' false positive rate, if we wish to maintain the same level of availability as FRB recovery with no false positives: a 97.2% false positive rate using µRBs yields the same number of failed requests as a 0% false positive rate for FRBs. This result illustrates how the order-of-magnitude shorter recovery time of µRBs compounds the reduced effect µRB-ing has on a service's end-user-visible functional degradation.
Although µRB-ing requires more precise diagnosis than FRB-ing, it seems that the benefit of µRBs outweigh the added requirement in precision. Diagnosis quality can be characterized in terms of false negative rate FN diag (how Figure 6 . Impact of µRB on Failure Detection. We injected a null reference fault in the most frequently called component (9.3% of total workload), and recovered with FRB or µRB, respectively. In the left graph, we assume FP diag = 0 and vary T det by introducing a corresponding delay in the monitor. In the right graph, T det ≈ 0 (corresponding to UDP packet delivery time in our LAN) and we vary FP diag by generating spurious failure reports. Load is 350 clients.
many of the failed components were not diagnosed faulty) and false positive rate FP diag (how many of the diagnosedfaulty components were in fact not faulty). Our primitive diagnosis algorithm does not yield false negatives (FN diag = 0), which we believe is typical for componentized applications like RUBiS, that have well defined mappings from entry points (servlets) to component paths. In terms of false positives, however, our algorithm is weak: in the experiment of Figure 1 it caused the µRB of 10 components, whereas only 4 were faulty (FP diag = 60%). A fault decision tree-based diagnosis system used at eBay [10] achieves FP diag = 24%; if with FP diag = 60% µRBs can reduce the number of failed requests by 90%, then using better diagnosis should only yield better results. µRB-based recovery is cheap, hence more tolerant to unnecessary recovery actions (false positives) than full reboots; this suggests that more aggressive failure detectors with higher false positive rates can be used in µRB-able systems. Since a thorough discussion and implementation of failure detection and diagnosis was beyond the scope of this work, we expect the reader to extrapolate from these results to the detection/diagnosis algorithm of his/her choice.
Averting Failures with Microrejuvenation
Despite automatic garbage collection, resource leaks are a major problem for many large-scale Java applications; a recent study of IBM customers' J2EE e-business software revealed that production systems frequently crash because of memory leaks [29] . To avoid unpredictable leak-induced crashes, operators resort to preventive rebooting, or software rejuvenation [18] . Some of the largest U.S. financial companies reboot their J2EE applications as often as several times a day [28] to recover memory, network sockets, file descriptors, etc. In this section we show that µRB-based rejuvenation (microrejuvenation) is as effective as a FRB in preventing leak-induced failures, but does so at a fourth of a FRB's cost in failed requests.
We injected memory leaks in two components of our application: a stateless session EJB that is among the most frequently called components, and the longest-recovering entity EJB. We chose aggressive leak rates that allowed us to keep each experiment to less than 1 hour. With slower leaks we expect to see the same results, but after a longer time. To motivate our interest in rejuvenation, we show in Figure 7 the effects of these leaks in the absence of rejuvenation: once the 1-GB memory heap is exhausted, the system grinds to a halt. A few requests already in the system continue to be served correctly, but with latencies on the order of minutes. Most requests fail upon running out of memory and new requests are not being accepted. Memory utilization Cumulative GC Time Figure 7 . Memory leaks induce failure. We inject a 2 KB/call leak in Item and a 250 KB/call leak in SB ViewItem; timeout-based failure detection is disabled. At t=25.2 and t=26, JBoss released an object pool, which freed up 4 KB of memory, allowing incoming requests to be accepted, but then promptly failing. The system spends all its time trying to reclaim memory.
In Figure 8 we show how this failure can be prevented. Our recovery service periodically checks the amount of available memory; if it drops below M alarm , then the recovery service µRBs components in a rolling fashion until available memory exceeds a threshold M sufficient . In addition to monitoring memory, production systems could monitor a number of other system parameters, such as number of file descriptors, CPU utilization, lock graphs for identifying deadlocks, etc.
The recovery service does not have any knowledge of which components need to µRB-ed in order to reclaim memory. Our recovery service maintains a list of candidate components for rejuvenation, which is initially in random order. As it performes microrejuvenations, the service assigns a score to each component based on how much memory was released by µRB-ing it. The list of components is kept sorted by score and, the next time memory runs low, the recovery service proceeds with µRB-ing components that are expected to release most memory, re-sorting as needed.
In Figure 8 we compare FRB-based rejuvenation to microrejuvenation using a scenario that is worst case for µRBs: the initial microrejuvenation order is such that the components leaking most memory are µRB-ed last. Since the recovery service started in a worst case scenario for µRBs, it ends up rebooting the entire application by pieces during the first round of rejuvenation, Afterward, the list of candidate components is reordered, improving the efficiency of subsequent rejuvenations. SB ViewItem had the most leaked memory at the time of the first microrejuvenation, so it got pushed to the front of the candidate list, followed by Item. For the second rejuvenation, µRB-ing SB ViewItem is sufficient to bring utilization below the 200 MB threshold (80% available memory). On the third rejuvenation, however, both SB ViewItem and Item require re- 80%. The recovery service probes available memory every 10 sec. µRBs reduce the number of failed requests from 4,317 to 1,049 (a factor of four) and do not let Gawever reach zero. The garbage collector is invoked after each µRB, so time spent garbage collecting suffers a fourfold increase from 12 sec to 48 sec. In spite of this, microrejuvenation increases the number of successful requests by 5%, from 78,405 to 82,911.
juvenation, which explains the higher number of failed requests. On the fourth rejuvenation, µRB-ing SB ViewItem is once again sufficient. We expect this pattern would have continued if we had let the experiment run.
We also implemented a fixed schedule for microrejuvenation, that µRBs components based on a per-component time-to-live specified in an XML file or specified at runtime through a Web interface. As expected, it was less effective than the reactive policy described above. However, there may be resource leaks in the application that cannot be monitored as easily as memory, or for which thresholds cannot be easily established; in such cases, a fixed microrejuvenation schedule combined with a reactive one would be warranted.
Notice that, in the first attempt, the entire application was rejuvenated by pieces without ever letting G aw drop to zero. The commonly used argument for software rejuvenation is that it turns unplanned total downtime into planned total downtime. Here we've shown that microrejuvenation can turn unplanned total downtime into planned partial downtime. Of course, microrejuvenation cannot reclaim resources leaked by the application server, but this is a shortcoming it shares with FRB.
Performance Impact
This final set of experiments shows that our µRB-centric design has a negligible effect on steady-state fault-free throughput and latency. Moreover, our system's performance is in line with that of a production Internet auction service. Table 3 compares three different configurations: vanilla JBoss 3.2.1 release running HttpSessionenabled RUBiS (as described in Section 5.2), and SSMenabled RUBiS running on top of µRB-enabled JBoss and vanilla JBoss 3.2.1, respectively.
Comparing the first two configurations, we see that in spite of the modifications we made to enable µRB-ing, throughput remains virtually the same (within 1%). On the other hand, average response time doubles from 39 to 82 msec. However, human-perceptible delay is commonly believed to be 100-200 msec, which means that the 82 msec latency is of no consequence for an interactive Internet service [27] . Both latency and throughput are within the range of measurements done at a major Internet auction service [39] : average throughput per cluster node is 41 req/sec, while latency varies between 33 and 300 msec. A comparison of HttpSession-RUBiS and SSM-RUBiS running on vanilla JBoss reveals that the observed increase in response time is entirely due to our use of SSM. Given that session state is externalized to a separate node, accessing it requires the session object to be marshalled, sent over the network, then unmarshalled; this consumes considerably more CPU than if it were kept in the server's memory. These results also suggest that maintaining a write-through cache of session data in the application server could absorb some of this latency penalty. However, performance optimization was not one of our goals, so we did not explore this possibility. We found that by dropping the per-node load to 150 clients, µRB-JBoss with SSM-RUBiS delivers an average latency of 38 msec. Thus, if latency is of concern, it would be sufficient to increase a 3-node cluster to a 7-node cluster (thus redistributing the client load) to recoup the loss. However, with only 150 clients, each node ends up being underutilized by more than a factor of two.
We compared our µRB-able system to an unmodified J2EE system and found insignificant performance overhead. However, J2EE already provides many of the features we were looking for in a µRB-able system, so it may already incorporate a corresponding performance penalty. Never-theless, the absolute performance of our system is comparable to that of a large, established Internet service.
Discussion
Some J2EE applications, like RUBiS, are already µRB-friendly and require minimal changes to take advantage of our µRB-enabled application server. From our experience with other J2EE applications, we concluded that the biggest challenges in making them µRB-able would be to extricate session state handling from the application logic, and to ensure that persistent state is properly updated with transactions. The rest of the work is already in our prototype application server, so can be leveraged across all J2EE applications.
In the rest of this section we discuss limitations of µRB-based recovery, as well as discuss the building of µRB-able systems outside the J2EE framework. Finally, we discuss the issue of truly resolving root causes of failure, as opposed to just temporarily curing them through µRB-ing.
Limitations of µRB-based Recovery
It may appear that µRBs introduce three classes of problems: interruption of a component during a state update, improper reclamation of an µRB-ed component's external resources, and delay of a (needed) full reboot.
Impact on non-transactional shared state
If state updates are atomic, as they are with a database and with SSM, there is no distinction between µRBs and FRBs from the point of view of the state store. The case of nontransactional, shared EJB state is more challenging: the µRB of one component may leave the state inconsistent, unbeknownst to the other components that share it. A FRB, on the other hand, would not give the other components the opportunity to see the inconsistent state, since they would be rebooted as well. J2EE best-practices documents do discourage sharing state by passing references between EJBs or using static variables, but we believe they could be enforced by a suitably modified JIT compiler; alternatively, should the runtime detect such practices, it could disable the use of µRBs for the application in question.
Note that a FRB would avoid this pitfall but at the cost of losing the state. In terms of our testbed, the shared state could be corrupted such that sessions are preserved but unusable, whereas in vanilla JBoss the sessions would be lost altogether. In general, this is a risk whenever transient or semi-persistent state is made persistent, and was a major reason why application-generic checkpoint-based recovery in Unix was found not to work well [24] . In the logical limit, all code becomes "stateless" and recovery will involve either repairing corrupted data structures in the persistent state itself or µRB-ing processing components.
Interaction with external resources
If a component circumvents JBoss and acquires an external resource that the application server is not aware of, then µRB-ing the component may leak the resource in a way that a JBoss restart would not (however, RUBiS restart still would). For example, we experimentally verified that an EJB A can directly open a JDBC connection to a database (without using the application server's wrapped JDBC service), acquire a database lock, then share the connection with another EJB B. When A is µRB-ed, the lock persists, because the JDBC connection (and A's DB session) is not terminated upon µRB as JBoss has no knowledge of it. The DB therefore does not release the lock until after A's DB session timeout. If we instead rebooted the whole JBoss process, the resulting termination by the OS of the underlying TCP connection would cause the immediate termination of the DB session and the release of the lock.
The above case is contrived in that it violates EJB programming practices, but it can occur in principle. It illustrates the need for application components to obtain resources exclusively through the facilities provided by the application server.
Delaying a full reboot
The more state gets segregated out of the application, the less effective a reboot becomes at scrubbing this data. Moreover, our implementation of µRBs does not scrub application-global data maintained by the application server, such as the JDBC connection pool and various other caches (with a few exceptions, described in Section 4.2). µRBs also generally cannot recover from problems occurring at layers below the application, such as the application server or the JVM. In all these cases, a full server restart may be required.
Poor failure diagnosis may result in one or more ineffectual µRBs of the wrong EJBs, leading to µRB-ing progressively larger groups of components until the whole application is rebooted. Even in this case, however, µRB-ing adds only a small additional cost to the total recovery cost.
Finally, Java does not allow for explicit resource release, so the best we were able to do without extensive JVM modifications was to call the system garbage collector following a µRB. However, this form of resource reclamation does not complete in an amount of time that is independent of the size of the resource and the size of the system. We believe that efficient support for µRBs should provide a nearlyconstant-time resource reclamation mechanism, which will allow µRBs to synchronously clean resources up.
Generalizing Beyond Our Prototype
While we feel J2EE makes it easier to write a µRB-able application, because its model is amenable to state externalization and component isolation, we believe it is possible to provide µRB support to other types of systems. In this section we describe design aspects that would deserve consideration in such extensions.
Isolation: EJB isolation in J2EE is not enforced by lower-level (hardware) mechanisms, as would be the case with separate process address spaces; consequently, bugs in the Java virtual machine or the application server could result in state corruption crossing EJB boundaries. Depending on the system, stronger levels of isolation may be warranted, such as can be achieved with virtual machines [16] , microkernels [22] , protection domains [38] , etc. Dependencies between components need to be minimized, because a dense dependency graph increases the size of recovery groups, so µRBs may take longer.
Workload: µRBs thrive on workloads consisting of fine grain, independent requests; if a system is faced with long running operations, then the activity of the system needs to be periodically checkpointed to keep the cost of µRBs low. In the same vein, requests need to be sufficiently selfcontained to allow a fresh instance of a µRB-ed component to pick it up and continue processing where the previous instance left off. If requests incorporate information on whether they are idempotent, then they enable transparent retries of failed requests.
Transparent Retry: To allow for µRB-ing and smooth reintegration of µRB-ed components, all inter-component interactions should have a timeout; if no response is received to a call within the allotted timeframe, the caller can gracefully handle the situation. Such timeouts provide an orthogonal mechanism for turning all non-Byzantine failures into fail-stop events, which are easier to accomodate and serve to contain failures. If components invoke a currently µRB-ing component, they can be given a RetryAfter(n) exception, indicating that the requests can be re-submitted after the estimated time to recover. Recovering from a failed idempotent operation entails simply reissuing it; for non-idempotent operations, rollback or compensating operations are in order. Transparent recovery of requests can hide intra-system component failures and µRBs from end users.
Leases: Resources in a frequently-µRB-ing system should be leased, rather than permanently allocated, to allow centralizing the responsibility for cleaning up after µRBs that may leave orphaned resources. Such resources go beyond memory and file descriptors: we believe many types of persistent state should be leased (after which it is either deleted or archived out of the system), as well as CPU: if a computation hands and does not renew its execution lease, it should be terminated with an µRB. If requests carry a time-to-live, then those that are stuck be purged from the system once this TTL runs out.
Short-Term vs. Long-Term Cures
Recovering by reboot does not mean that the root causes should not eventually be identified and the bugs fixed. However, rebooting provides a separation of concerns between recovery and diagnosis/repair, consistent with the observation that the latter is not always a prerequisite for the former.
Building crash-safe systems is in some sense wellunderstood; we have shown here how to build a microcrashsafe system. Attempting to repair/recover a reboot-curable failure by anything other than a reboot in such systems always entails the risk of taking longer than a reboot would have taken in the first place: trying to diagnose the problem can often turn what could have been a fast reboot into a long-delayed reboot, thus hurting availability. We therefore advocate a general approach to recovery that involves always µRB-ing as the first recovery attempt.
Related Work
Our work has three major themes: reboot-based recovery, minimizing recovery time, and reducing disruption during recovery. In this section we discuss a sample of work related to these themes, as well as complementary work in the area of fault diagnosis.
Separation of control and data is key to reboot-based recovery. There are many ways to isolate subsystems (e.g., using processes, virtual machines [16] , microkernels [22] , protection domains [38] , etc.). Additionally, in pre-J2EE transaction processing monitors, each piece of system functionality, such as doing I/O with clients, writing to the transaction log, etc. was a separate process communicating with the others using IPC or RPC, with shared system state kept in shared-memory structures and session state managed by a dedicated component. Although the architecture did not scale well and was eventually superseded by today's application servers, the multiple-processes approach provided better isolation and would have been more amenable to µRBs.
A number of efforts have centered around reducing reboot time through careful engineering. For example, FSMLabs [15] have trimmed down Linux such that it can boot in under 200 msec. While these optimizations are primarily driven by the real-time community seeking to embed Linux in a variety of devices, it does open the door for rebootbased recovery. In contrast to such approaches, we choose to partition our system and perform a "partial reboot" as a way to reduce recovery time.
Much work on Internet services has focused on reducing the functional disruption associated with recovering from a transient failure. Failover in clusters is the canonical example; Brewer [3] proposed the "DQ principle" as a way to understand how a partial failure can be mapped to either a decrease in queries served or a decrease in data returned per query.
A large fraction of recovery time, and therefore availability, is the time required to detect failures and localize them well enough to determine recovery action [8] . A study [32] found that earlier detection might have mitigated or avoided 65% of reported user-visible failures. By enabling sloppier fault detection, we make a number of detection and diagnosis solutions more useful. For example, statistical learning approaches like Pinpoint [9] , while prone to false positives, are useful for systems whose structure is not known. Combining Pinpoint with µRBs has the potential to improve availability of Internet systems with relatively little engineering.
Conclusions
By completely separating process recovery from data recovery, we enabled the use of microreboots in a J2EE application server. µRBs have many of the same desirable recovery and resource-reclamation behaviors as full reboots, but are an order of magnitude less disruptive. We have made rebooting cheap enough to no longer be feared.
We showed that, in a 2-node cluster, skipping failover and simply µRB-ing the faulty node reduced failed requests by an order of magnitude compared to the commonly-used failover-and-reboot approach. We also demonstrated that µRB-based recovery can achieve higher levels of availability even in the case of failure detection with false positive rates as high as 97%. Using microreboots, we were able to reclaim memory leaks in our prototype application without shutting it down, thus continuously maintaining availability. Finally, we showed that these benefits come at less than 1% loss in average throughput and a human-imperceptible increase in average latency.
Although we exploited some properties of the J2EE programming model to simplify our implementation, we believe the techniques can be applied more generally to non-J2EE systems. Microreboots are a recovery mechanism cheap enough for frequent use as a first line of defense; even if an µRB-ing is ineffective, it cannot hurt. Therefore, microreboots offer the potential for significant simplification of recovery management.
